This rule was developed in part by Rachel Xu and Zifei (FeiFei) Han at the October 20-22, 2017 OurCS Workshop (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ourcs/register.html).
For more information about this statement, see the About the OurCS Workshop page.
For OAuth, use a secure Android method to deliver access tokens. The method to do with mobile apps and their platforms is not specified in the OAuth 1.0 or OAuth 2.0 standards. Access tokens can be securely delivered if the service provider can identify recipients using a globally unique identifier.
This guideline is under construction. |
This noncompliant code example shows an application that
TBD |
An Intent can securely send an access token to its intended mobile relying party app, using an explicit intent, because the relying party can be uniquely identified through its developer key hash.
In this compliant solution the application
TBD |
Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
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DRD27-J | Medium | Probable | Medium |
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Hyperlink black-font text "the CERT website" below, with URL as follows: https://www.kb.cert.org/vulnotes/bymetric?searchview&query=FIELD+KEYWORDS+contains+<RULE_ID>
In the URL example above, <RULE_ID> should be substituted by this CERT guideline ID (e.g., INT31-C). Then, remove this purple-font paragraph.
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Fill in the table below with at least one entry row, per these instructions, then remove this purple-font section.
Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch |
[Chen 14] | OAuth Demystified for Mobile Application Developers. OAuthDemystified.pdf |
[IETF OAuth1.0a] | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). OAuth core 1.0 revision a. http://oauth.net/core/1.0a/. |
[IETF OAuth2.0] | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749. |