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Attempting to dereference a null pointer results in undefined behavior, typically abnormal program termination.

Noncompliant Code Example

In this noncompliant code example, input_str is copied into dynamically allocated memory referenced by str. If malloc() fails, it returns a null pointer that is assigned to str. When str is dereferenced in memcpy(), the program behaves in an unpredictable manner.

size_t size = strlen(input_str)+1;
str = (char *)malloc(size);
memcpy(str, input_str, size);
/* ... */
free(str);
str = NULL;

Compliant Solution

To correct this error, ensure the pointer returned by malloc() is not null. This also ensures compliance with rule MEM32-C. Detect and handle memory allocation errors.

size_t size = strlen(input_str)+1;
str = (char *)malloc(size);
if (str == NULL) {
  /* Handle Allocation Error */
}
memcpy(str, input_str, size);
/* ... */
free(str);
str = NULL;

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example can be found in drivers/net/tun.c and affects Linux kernel 2.6.30 [Goodin 2009].

static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)  {
  struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
  struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
  struct sock *sk = tun->sk;
  unsigned int mask = 0;

  if (!tun)
    return POLLERR;

  DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: tun_chr_poll\n", tun->dev->name);

  poll_wait(file, &tun->socket.wait, wait);

  if (!skb_queue_empty(&tun->readq))
    mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;

  if (sock_writeable(sk) ||
     (!test_and_set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags) &&
     sock_writeable(sk)))
    mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;

  if (tun->dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
    mask = POLLERR;

  tun_put(tun);
  return mask;
}

The vulnerability occurs because sk is initialized to tun->sk before checking if tun is equal to NULL. Of course, this should be done first because the GCC compiler (in this case) optimizes it and completely removes the if (!tun) check because it is performed after the assignment. As a result, the above vulnerability can result in a null pointer dereference exploit.

Normally, null pointer dereference results in access violation and abnormal program termination. However, it is possible to permit null pointer dereferencing on several operating systems, for example, using mmap(2) with the MAP_FIXED flag on Linux and Mac OS X or using shmat(2) with the SHM_RND flag on Linux [Liu 2009].

Compliant Solution

This compliant solution eliminates the null pointer deference by initializing sk to tun->sk following the null pointer check.

static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)  {
  struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
  struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
  struct sock *sk;
  unsigned int mask = 0;

  if (!tun)
    return POLLERR;

  sk = tun->sk;

  DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: tun_chr_poll\n", tun->dev->name);

  poll_wait(file, &tun->socket.wait, wait);

  if (!skb_queue_empty(&tun->readq))
    mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;

  if (sock_writeable(sk) ||
     (!test_and_set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags) &&
     sock_writeable(sk)))
    mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;

  if (tun->dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
    mask = POLLERR;

  tun_put(tun);
  return mask;
}

Risk Assessment

Dereferencing a null pointer results in undefined behavior, typically abnormal program termination. In some situations, however, dereferencing a null pointer can lead to the execution of arbitrary code [Jack 2007, van Sprundel 2006]. The indicated severity is for this more severe case; on platforms where it is not possible to exploit a null pointer dereference to execute arbitrary code, the actual severity is low.

Rule

Severity

Likelihood

Remediation Cost

Priority

Level

EXP34-C

high

likely

medium

P18

L1

Automated Detection

Tool

Version

Checker

Description

9.7.1

45 D

Fully Implemented

Fortify SCA

V. 5.0

 

 

Splint

3.1.1

 

 

Compass/ROSE

 

 

can detect violations of this rule. In particular, Rose ensures that any pointer returned by malloc(), calloc(), or realloc() is first checked for NULL before being used (otherwise it is free()-d). Rose does not handle cases where an allocation is assigned to an lvalue that is not a variable (such as a struct member or C++ function call returning a reference.)

2017.07

CHECKED_RETURN

finds instances where a pointer is checked against NULL and then later dereferenced.

2017.07

NULL_RETURNS

identifies functions that can return a null pointer but are not checked.

2017.07

REVERSE_INULL

identifies code that dereferences a pointer and then checks the pointer against NULL.

2017.07

FORWARD_NULL

can find the instances where NULL is explicitly dereferenced or a pointer is checked against null but then dereferenced anyway.
Coverity Prevent cannot discover all violations of this rule, so further verification is necessary.

2024.1

NPD.* *RNPD.*

 

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Related Guidelines

CERT C++ Secure Coding Standard: EXP34-CPP. Ensure a null pointer is not dereferenced

The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java: EXP01-J. Never dereference null pointers

ISO/IEC 9899:1999 Section 6.3.2.3, "Pointers"

ISO/IEC TR 24772 "HFC Pointer casting and pointer type changes" and "XYH Null Pointer Dereference"

MITRE CWE: CWE-476, "NULL Pointer Dereference"

Bibliography

[Goodin 2009]
[Jack 2007]
[Liu 2009]
[van Sprundel 2006]
[Viega 2005] Section 5.2.18, "Null-pointer dereference"


EXP33-C. Do not reference uninitialized memory      03. Expressions (EXP)      EXP35-C. Do not access or modify an array in the result of a function call after a subsequent sequence point

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